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PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVACY, DATA SECURITY
AND TORT LAW
Robert L. Rabin*
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In 2014, did you shop at any of these retailers who had consumer
records compromised: Target (70 million records),1 or EBay (145 mil-
lion records),2 or Home Depot (56 million records)?3  Did you have a
health insurance plan through Anthem or Blue Cross prior to 2015 (80
million records)?4  Did you have a bank or credit card account with JP
Morgan Chase prior to 2015 (83 million records)?5  Have you applied
to work in the federal government in the past fifteen years (21.5 mil-
lion records)?6  If you answered Yes to any of these questions, there is
a good chance that your personal data has been stolen, leaked, ex-
posed, or otherwise revealed to an unauthorized third party as part of
a data breach.
Since 2005, more than 900 million records have been improperly
exposed or accessed as a result of 5.041 million data breaches in the
United States alone.7  In 2015, $15 billion was stolen from 13.1 million
American consumers who were victims of identity theft, much of
* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.  My appreciation to Peter Davis
and Natalie Lin for valuable research assistance.
1. Elizabeth A. Harris & Nicole Perlroth, For Target, the Breach Numbers Grow, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/target-breach-affected-70-million-
customers.html.
2. Nicole Perlroth, EBay Urges New Passwords After Breach, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/technology/ebay-reports-attack-on-its-computer-network
.html?_r=0.
3. Nicole Perlroth, Home Depot Says Data from 56 Million Cards Was Taken in Breach, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 18, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/home-depot-says-data-
from-56-million-cards-taken-in-breach/.
4. Reed Abelson & Matthew Goldstein, Millions of Anthem Customers Targeted in Cyberat-
tack, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/business/hackers-breached-
data-of-millions-insurer-says.html; see also How to Access & Sign Up for Identity Theft Repair &
Credit Monitoring Services, ANTHEM, https://www.anthemfacts.com (last visited Aug. 8, 2016).
5. Id.
6. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 21.5 Million People,
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/office-of-personnel-manage
ment-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html.
7. Chronology of Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacy
rights.org/data-breaches (last visited Aug. 8, 2016).
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which could be traced back to data breaches.8  Corporations and gov-
ernments also suffer: In 2014, the estimated cost per record lost or
stolen due to data breach was $145.9  Given that over 85 million
records were lost or stolen in 2014,10 corporations undoubtedly face
substantial costs from data breaches.  Even apart from data breaches,
consumers face privacy risks from the misuse or misappropriation of
their data by corporations.11
Data breaches can be traced to three main causes: (1) malicious or
criminal attack; (2) system glitch or malfunction; or (3) human error.12
In 2014, approximately 47% of data breaches resulted from malicious
or criminal attacks, 29% from system glitches, and 25% from human
error.13  Breaches due to malicious attacks were more expensive to
resolve ($170 per record) compared to those that stemmed from
glitches ($142 per record) or human error ($137 per record).14
Certain industries are more affected by data breaches than others.15
In 2014, 42% of data breaches stemmed from the education sector,
though these breaches only resulted in 9.7% of the total number of
exposed records.16  In the same year, 33% of the total number of
breaches came from the business sector (not including finance or
healthcare), but these breaches resulted in nearly 80% of exposed
records.17  The remaining breaches fall within the financial, health-
care, or government sectors.18  Unsurprisingly, data breaches affect
each of these industries differently.  The education and healthcare sec-
tors, for example, suffer the greatest costs-per-record-per-breach, at
8. Identity Theft and Cybercrime, INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/identity-
theft-and-cybercrime (last visited Aug. 8, 2016).
9. PONEMON INST., 2015 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL ANALYSIS (2015) [herein-
after 2015 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY], https://nhlearningsolutions.com/Portals/0/Docu
ments/2015-Cost-of-Data-Breach-Study.pdf.
10. See Identity Theft and Cybercrime, supra note 8. R
11. See, e.g., Elizabeth Blosfield, Dangers in Data Collection: How Much Is Too Much?, INS. J.
(Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/coverstory/2016/10/24/429763.htm.
For purposes of this Article, a data breach is defined as the unauthorized disclosure of private
personal information.  Generally, this personal information includes an individual’s name com-
bined with another piece of confidential or private information, such as a social security number,
credit card number, or piece of medical information.  Sasha Romanosky, David Hoffman, and
Alessandro Acquisti use a similar definition in their paper, Empirical Analysis of Data Breach
Litigation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 74, 80 (2014).
12. 2015 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY, supra note 9, at 2, 10. R
13. Id. at 10.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 9.
16. Data Breaches Pose a Threat Across All Industries, CSID, https://www.csid.com/resources/
stats/data-breaches-by-industry/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2016).
17. Id.  This disparity can be the product of more records exposed per breach.
18. Id.
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$300 and $363 per record respectively, where the average cost per re-
cord released for any given data breach is around $154.19
Estimating the effects of a data breach on individual consumers is
more difficult.  As noted, an increasing number of Americans have
become victims of various forms of identity theft, which often results
in monetary loss and a decrease in an individual’s credit score.  Be-
yond identity theft, data breach victims are likely to feel that they
need to mitigate future harm by replacing credit cards, closing ac-
counts, and obtaining continuous credit monitoring.  At a more basic
level, consumers who have been victims of data breaches feel that
their privacy has been violated.  Little survey work has been published
on these subjects, but it seems beyond dispute that data breaches have
tangible effects that are widely felt among the American population.
Several recent cases help illustrate the risks and challenges posed by
data breaches.  During the 2014 holiday shopping season, hackers
stole at least 70 million records from Target.20  Hackers obtained
credit card information from 40 million consumers who shopped at
Target between November 2014 and December 2014 by installing
malware on Target’s systems.  The same hackers also stole up to 70
million additional customer records, including mailing and email ad-
dresses, phone numbers, and names.21  In the months following the
data breach, it was revealed that Target’s security system—installed
by the well-reputed computer security firm FireEye—detected the
breach before any data had been stolen.22  For somewhat unexplained
reasons, Target’s security officials declined to intervene—in fact, they
had even turned off a FireEye feature that would have automatically
deleted the malware from the system (again for unexplained rea-
sons).23  The result of this reportedly conventional and relatively un-
sophisticated malware attack was the loss of 70 million records,
touching nearly one in three American consumers.24  Target did not
realize that it had been hacked until federal law enforcement officials
notified them on December 12, 2014, by which time it was too late.25
In July 2015, the White House revealed that the records of 21.5 mil-
lion people were stolen as a result of a data breach of the Office of
19. Id.; see also 2015 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY, supra note 9, at 9. R
20. Harris & Perlroth, supra note 1. R
21. Michael Riley et al., Missed Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit Card Numbers: How
Target Blew It, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/
2014-03-13/target-missed-alarms-in-epic-hack-of-credit-card-data#p3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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Personnel Management (OPM).26  “Every person given a [federal]
government background check for the last 15 years was probably af-
fected,” according to OPM.27  Hackers were able to steal names, so-
cial security numbers, biometric fingerprint data, travel information,
addresses, and other sensitive personnel information as part of the
OPM data breach.28  As in the Target case, there were warning signs
over a period of years indicating that OPM’s computer systems were
antiquated and at serious risk of intrusion, yet no action was taken to
secure the vast amount of personal data until it was too late.29  The
hack has since been blamed on elements associated with the Chinese
government.30  The U.S. government has provided victims with credit
and identity theft monitoring for three years,31 but this likely provides
little comfort to national security experts concerned about the poten-
tial intelligence ramifications of government employees’ sensitive per-
sonnel files in the hands of the Chinese government.  The OPM case
shows that the negative effects of data breaches go far beyond identity
theft and monetary loss.32
Anthem, one of the largest health insurers in the United States, suf-
fered a data breach in 2015 that resulted in the exposure of 80 million
patients’ records, including “names, social security numbers, birth-
days, addresses, emails and employment information.”33  There was
no evidence that sensitive medical records were stolen as part of the
breach, but the loss of protected personal information was substantial.
Investigators suspect that Chinese state-sponsored hackers were be-
hind the Anthem breach as well.34  As in the OPM case, Anthem has
provided victims with credit monitoring and identity theft
protection.35
Consumers face threats to their personal privacy wholly separate
from the types of unauthorized data breaches described above.  Most
26. Davis, supra note 6. R
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see also Michelle Singletary, What to Do If You Are Affected by the OPM Data
Breach, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/get-there/what-
to-do-if-you-are-affected-by-the-opm-data-breach/2015/12/09/534455e0-9dd0-11e5-a3c5-c77f2cc5
a43c_story.html?utm_term=.0a96cd4ab495.
32. Davis, supra note 6. R
33. Abelson & Goldstein, supra note 4. R
34. Michael Riley & Jordan Robertson, Chinese State-Sponsored Hackers Suspected in An-
them Attack, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2015, 5:40 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-02-05/signs-of-china-sponsored-hackers-seen-in-anthem-attack.
35. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. R
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notably, consumers face risks that their personal privacy will be vio-
lated by unauthorized corporate access, misuse, or misappropriation
of their data.36  These claims of corporate misconduct can be grouped
under a separate umbrella of “data misuse” issues.  Data breaches re-
late to the unauthorized access to personal information by a third
party.  Data misuse or misappropriation, by contrast, involves the au-
thorized—at least at some level—access to information by the party
that holds that information for unauthorized commercial or other
purposes.
Statistics on the scope of this problem are hard to come by, given
the less public nature of the problem and the less tangible and imme-
diate nature of the harm.  In many cases, corporations sell or transfer
consumer data to a third party without clear authorization from the
consumer.  One prominent example was the ChoicePoint debacle of
2005.37  In that case, ChoicePoint, a prominent data trader, admitted
to selling personal information of 163,000 California residents—which
they possessed legally—to identity thieves.38  At least 800 consumers
had their identities stolen because of this incident.39  This case raised
difficult data privacy dilemmas: ChoicePoint existed to sell personal
information to legitimate businesses, but instead, they provided this
information to a ring of identity thieves who had registered fake com-
panies.40  The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) enforcement action
resulted in a $15 million settlement, which was the largest civil penalty
in the FTC’s history at that time.41
In addition to improper sales to a third party, some data misuse
cases focus on a corporation’s use of consumer data for its own pur-
poses—generally to provide targeted ads or products to consumers.
In 2012, it was revealed that Google had placed tracking cookies on
Safari users’ computers to collect data on their web browsing prefer-
ences in order to provide targeted advertisements.42  Google then
36. Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal Informa-
tion, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 143, 150 (2006).
37. Id. at 154.
38. Id. at 154–55.
39. Bob Sullivan, ChoicePoint to Pay $15 Million over Data Breach, NBC NEWS (Jan. 26,
2006), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11030692/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/choicepoint-
pay-million-over-data-breach/.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Claire Cain Miller, F.T.C. Fines Google $22.5 Million for Safari Privacy Violations,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/f-t-c-fines-google-22-5-mil-
lion-for-safari-privacy-violations/.  Some brief technical background: Safari is a popular web
browser, used by millions of consumers to surf the Internet.  Cookies are small files created and
used by companies like Google to track the habits of Internet users.  When a user visits a Google
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used this information to better target ads to users, in turn making their
ad products more valuable to potential ad buyers.43  Presumably in
response to consumer pressure, Safari, an Apple browser, created a
tool to limit both the creation of cookies and the ability of cookies to
track web browsing habits.44  In violation of a previous FTC settle-
ment and its public pronouncements, however, Google proceeded to
override the Safari tool and continued to use cookies to track Safari
users.45  The result was extended litigation that eventually resulted in
a $22.5 million FTC settlement.46
A similar case was brought against Facebook for its use of mem-
bers’ images in targeted advertisements known as “Sponsored Sto-
ries.”47  Unlike the case against Google, this was not a regulatory
action brought on unfair competition grounds, but rather a class ac-
tion brought on Right of Publicity grounds.  The principal claim in this
case, Fraley v. Facebook, Inc.48—which is discussed further in the next
section—was that Facebook misappropriated the plaintiffs’ images in
paid advertisements without consent, and in so doing, unwillingly
drafted them as unpaid and unknowing spokespersons for Facebook
products.49  After the court denied Facebook’s motion to dismiss on
newsworthiness grounds, the parties settled for $20 million.50
Despite the successes just mentioned, the continuing problems of
data breaches, data misuse, and the consequent failure of current laws
to adequately deal with the problems is widely acknowledged.  Not-
withstanding the widespread recognition of the problems, there is lit-
tle consensus on the appropriate legal mechanisms to prevent or
punish data breaches or provide compensation to those harmed by
such breaches.  This Article surveys one approach to dealing with
these problems: The pathways available through tort law.
But tort, of course, is not the only strategy for addressing the data
breach concerns.  Current legal approaches to dealing with data
breaches can be divided into three main categories.  First, regulatory
strategies aimed at setting standards of data protection through state
page, for example, it might create a cookie that can then follow the user around the web to track
web browsing habits.
43. Id.
44. United States v. Google, Inc., No. CV-12-04177 SI, 2012 WL 5833994, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 16, 2012).
45. Id.
46. Id. at *2; see also Miller, supra note 42. R
47. 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 790 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 814.
50. Id. at 815; see also Jesse Koehler, Note, Fraley v. Facebook: The Right of Publicity in
Online Social Networks, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 963, 964 (2013).
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and federal laws, and enforced either through the courts or federal
administrative agencies.  Second, information disclosure laws that re-
quire entities suffering data breaches to reveal to victims that their
information has been lost or stolen, with the general hope that the
market will favor companies with fewer breaches and thus provide
competitive incentives for companies to protect data.51  And finally,
ex post tort liability that allows victims to sue for damages, with the
twofold goal of compensating victims and shifting the incentives of
companies holding private data toward better data protection
practices.
Before turning to tort (the third of these approaches), I will provide
an overview in Part II of the regulatory enforcement and information
disclosure strategies for addressing the problem of data breach.  And
following my assessment of tort remedies in Part III, I will offer some
concluding thoughts, in a final Part, including a brief reprise on the
potential for more proactive federal regulatory action under the man-
date of the FTC.
II. REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT AND INFORMATION
DISCLOSURE LAWS
A. Regulatory Enforcement: Preventing and Responding
to Data Breaches
Regulatory enforcement at the federal level typically takes one of
two forms.  First, federal agencies use enforcement actions or
rulemaking to influence the data security practices of corporations
within the federal agency’s mandate.  The enforcement activities of
the FTC, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), and the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) illustrate this approach.  The second is the
imposition of criminal sanctions and other penalties for the access, dis-
closure, or theft of personal information.
The FTC prosecutes data breaches as “unfair and deceptive trade
practices” under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act52—a
strategy that has elements of both ex ante and ex post regulation.53
The FTC does not have the power to directly fine companies for un-
51. This taxonomy of legal approaches to data breaches comes from Sasha Romanosky &
Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic and Legal Perspec-
tives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1067–68 (2009).
52. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
53. For a comprehensive article examining the FTC’s authority in this realm, see Michael D.
Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has the Commis-
sion Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN L. REV. 127 (2008).
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fair practices, but its enforcement actions “typically result in consent
decrees that prohibit the company from future misconduct and re-
quire audits for up to 20 years.”54  The FTC can then fine businesses if
they violate a consent decree.55  As I will discuss further in Part IV, in
2015, the Third Circuit affirmed that the FTC has the power to regu-
late cybersecurity policies through section 5, thus putting the agency’s
enforcement of data security laws on solid legal ground.56  The FTC
also protects consumer privacy by regulating financial institutions
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.57  Under this Act, the FTC re-
quires financial institutions to maintain safeguards over their custom-
ers’ data and disclose to customers any release of that information to
third parties.58
The FCC has also stepped up its enforcement in response to data
breaches over the past five years.  In 2015, the FCC reached a $25
million settlement with AT&T based on AT&T’s unauthorized access
to personal customer information.59  The FCC bases its enforcement
authority on its interpretation of privacy provisions in section 222 of
the Communications Act and “unjust and unreasonable practices”
under section 201(b) of the Act.60  Through its actions, the FCC has
made clear that it expects Internet providers to “take ‘every reasona-
ble precaution’ to protect their customers’ data.”61
The SEC and the CFPB have also stepped up enforcement of data
security practices, within their mandates, to prevent and respond to
breaches—the SEC targeting publicly traded companies and the
CFPB targeting financial companies.  In fact, the CFPB brought its
first enforcement action under the Dodd-Frank Act for unfair or de-
ceptive practices on March 2, 2016, against Dwolla Inc., a digital pay-
ment company.62  Unlike the FTC, the CFPB has the statutory
54. Todd H. Greene et al., A Crash Course in Data-Security Regulation and Litigation, ACC
DOCKET, Sept. 1, 2015, at 92, 94.
55. FCC Continues Aggressive Action on Data Breaches, COOLEY (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www
.cooley.com/news/insight/2015/fcc-continues-aggressive-action-on-data-breaches.
56. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2015), aff’d, 799 F.3d 236
(3d Cir. 2015).
57. See Scott, supra note 53, at 173. R
58. Id. at 173–74.
59. FCC Continues Aggressive Action, supra note 55. R
60. Privacy of Customer Information, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012); Service and Charges, 47 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (2012).
61. FCC Continues Aggressive Action, supra note 55; see also Charlotte A. Tschider, Experi- R
menting with Privacy: Driving Efficiency Through a State-Informed Federal Data Breach Notifi-
cation and Data Protection Law, 18 TULANE J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 45, 54 (2015).
62. CFPB Takes Action Against Dwolla for Misrepresenting Data Security Practices, CON-
SUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/news
room/cfpb-takes-action-against-dwolla-for-misrepresenting-data-security-practices/.
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authority to directly fine companies that violate Dodd-Frank’s provi-
sions governing unfair business practices, including those related to
data security.63
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) en-
forces various federal laws, including the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA),64 and issues regulations regarding
the privacy and security of personal health records.  HHS has brought
enforcement actions to ensure compliance with these requirements.65
As will be noted below, HHS also mandates certain data breach noti-
fication rules pursuant to HIPAA.
Given the lack of comprehensive federal regulation, however, state
law has come to play an important role in preventing and responding
to data breaches.  State privacy laws of California and Massachusetts
are illustrative of the more privacy-protective schemes.  Four laws
form the backbone of California’s strategy.  First, the Shine the Light
Law requires companies to disclose to consumers the details of any
third parties with whom they have shared the consumer’s personal in-
formation.66  Second, the California Online Privacy Protection Act of
2003 requires operators of commercial websites that collect personal
information to devise a privacy policy and make that policy conspicu-
ously available to site users,67  and the company’s privacy policy must
explain the types of personal information collected by the website,
how users can request changes to the collected information, and how
users will learn about changes to the policy, among other require-
ments.68  Third, the recently expanded Data Security Law69 requires
all companies that maintain customer information to “implement and
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to
the nature of the information, to protect the personal information
from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclo-
sure.”70  Fourth, California has a widely-criticized but nevertheless im-
63. Yuka Hayashi, CFPB Fines Fintech Firm Dwolla over Data-Security Practices, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 2, 2016, 5:05 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-fines-fintech-firm-dwolla-over-data-se
curity-practices-1456956326.
64. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C and 42 U.S.C.).
65. See Data Breach Results in $4.8 Million HIPAA Settlements, DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/breach-notification/index.html (last visited
Aug. 9, 2016).
66. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.83–1798.84 (West, Westlaw current through 2016).
67. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West, Westlaw current through 2016).
68. Id.
69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5.
70. Id.
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portant data breach notification law.71  Outside of these four core
statutes, California also has a multitude of specific statutory provi-
sions setting protection standards for certain types of data and certain
categories of businesses.72  Companies that violate these laws may be
subject to suit by the California Attorney General.73  In all, this
scheme is typical of the state schemes most protective of privacy.
Massachusetts is one of the few states with even more restrictive
laws than California.  Like California, it requires companies to imple-
ment reasonable security measures and disclose breaches to affected
parties; however, it goes one step further: It requires companies to
devise a business “information security program” and defines specific
security elements for each program based on the size and type of busi-
ness.74  These elements include the encryption of personal information
under certain circumstances and various administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards.75  This law is one of the few that is preventative,
rather than merely reactive, and it requires specific data security mea-
sures of companies managing personal information within the state.76
B. Information Disclosure
Data breach notification laws are a regulatory strategy that deserves
separate consideration.  The federal government has various data
breach notification regulations, including, for example, HIPAA’s
Breach Notification Rule.77  The FTC also has similar rules that it ap-
plies to certain types of corporations.  Most importantly, forty-seven
states have passed data breach notification laws.78  California requires
companies to notify victims of a data breach “in the most expedient
time possible and without unreasonable delay.”79  Many other states
use similar language, though several mandate a specific time frame,
71. Id. § 1798.29.
72. For a list of all of California’s privacy laws, see Privacy Laws, CAL. DEP’T JUST. OFF.
ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/privacy-laws (last visited Aug. 9, 2016).
73. Evan M. Wooten, The State of Data-Breach Litigation and Enforcement: Before the 2013
Mega Breaches and Beyond, 24 J. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 229,
241 (2015).
74. Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the Commonwealth,
201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00 (2016).
75. Id.; see also Greene et al., supra note 54, at 102. R
76. Most states also maintain consumer protection laws that can be applied to data breaches
under certain circumstances, but these laws are mainly about ex post liability rather than ex ante
regulation.
77. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–164.414 (2016); see also Breach Notification Rule, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/breach-notification/index
.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2016).
78. Wooten, supra note 73, at 237 & n.57. R
79. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29(a), 1798.82(a) (West, Westlaw current through 2016).
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for example, a 30-day period within which notification must be com-
pleted.80  As amended in 2014, California’s notification statute also
requires that companies subject to data breaches provide free credit
monitoring to victims for at least one year.81
While data breach notification laws serve as a type of ex post regu-
lation, they also have a broader purpose: promoting a competitive and
transparent market for business services involving personal data.  The
hope is that data notification laws help publicize which companies are
protecting individuals’ data and which companies are failing to protect
individuals’ data, leading consumers to patronize the data-protecting
companies, and in turn putting competitive pressure on companies
with the worst data security to turn things around.82  Of course, this
assumes that consumers make decisions about where to shop or store
their information based on a company’s history of data breaches—not
an outlandish notion, but certainly a contestable one.
C. Shortcomings with Current Approaches
The current legal regime governing data breaches suffers from three
main problems: (1) uncompensated victims; (2) inadequate incentives
for companies and governments to invest in data security; and (3) un-
certainty for corporations with respect to their regulatory burdens and
litigation risk.  Any proposal to fix the legal regime surrounding data
breaches must address each of these three flaws if it is to succeed.
Given the massive increase in data breaches over the past decade, it
is clear that the current patchwork of regulatory strategies has failed
to prevent data breaches across a wide sector of entities, whether fi-
nancial, medical, governmental, or educational.  The more important
question is why have these regulatory efforts failed?  As the earlier
discussion indicates, there simply has not been any systematic effort to
address the data breach problem from a regulatory perspective.  First,
there is no comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing data
breaches.  Instead, one finds different agencies attempting to regulate
data breach within their narrow jurisdictions with little coordination
and certainly no standardization.  The FTC is the only body that truly
stretches across industries in its ability to regulate, but it faces other
challenges in its mission; in particular, the FTC regulates data
breaches solely as “unfair and deceptive business practices,” rather
than as simply insufficient measures relative to general industry data
80. Tschider, supra note 61, at 70 & n.118. R
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(d)(2)(G).
82. Romanosky & Acquisti, supra note 51, at 1074–75. R
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security standards or aspirational “best practices.”83  Second, adminis-
trative agencies tend to regulate data breaches only through individual
enforcement actions and without the issuance of clear rules and stan-
dards.  Such individual enforcement diminishes the efficacy of regula-
tion more broadly.  In addition, individual enforcement leads to
uncertainty among businesses regarding the appropriate standards for
data security and whether they will in fact be subject to an enforce-
ment action in any given situation.  Third, agencies are often forced to
stretch their statutory mandates to reach the type of conduct at issue
in data breach cases.  These limited mandates prevent broader regula-
tion of data security, and they may even focus on the less relevant
portions of industry conduct leading to a data breach.  Of course, even
if the regulatory systems were more robust, they would largely elide
the concern for compensating victims of data breaches when they
nonetheless occur.
Given that current strategies for data protection tend to be inade-
quate in addressing the underlying harms of the breach itself, tort law,
in its many guises, warrants examination to determine its potential
role in the data breach field.  Tort theories are especially inviting in
this realm (for exploration at least), as they have been applied to pro-
tect against certain dignitary and privacy harms that stem from the
disclosure of personal information.  Furthermore, successful applica-
tion of tort principles would mean that consumers would have wider
opportunities to pursue a legal course of action, hence incentivizing
firms to take better care of their data and avoid suboptimal practices.
III. TORT LAW AND DATA SECURITY
This Part analyzes the forms of responsibility recognized in privacy
and negligence law that might apply to protecting privacy interests
harmed by corporate failure to secure personal data.
A. The Privacy Torts
On the surface, common law torts devoted to protection of privacy
would seem a natural fit for securing a remedy to victims of corporate
data breach.  One need only view the doctrinal headings of the princi-
pal related privacy torts to generate positive expectations: public dis-
closure of private facts, intrusion upon seclusion, and appropriation of
name or likeness.84  Beneath the surface, however, the promise of re-
83. About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Jan. 21,
2017).
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652C, 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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medial relief is quickly called into question.  Let me briefly explore, in
turn, each of these privacy torts as remedial strategies.85
1. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
The cornerstone of this tort can be sketched out from consideration
of two leading opinions: Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.86 and Haynes v.
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.87  In Sidis, a child prodigy who had attained
notoriety for his mathematical skills became an eccentric recluse in
later life, far-removed from the world of public exposure—that is, un-
til the New Yorker Magazine ran a “where is he now” column re-
counting his idiosyncratic interests and mannerisms.88  His suit for
public exposure of private facts was dismissed by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals on the ground that there was a newsworthy interest
in how the life of a much-heralded boy genius unfolded.89
Haynes involved a more scholarly venture.  The plaintiff and his ex-
wife were the subject of a narrative as part of a far wider historical
examination in The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and
How It Changed America,90 a study of the mass movement from the
South to northern cities like Chicago during World War II and the
post-war era.91  The plaintiff was depicted by his ex-wife as a man who
drank heavily, neglected his children, could not keep a job, was un-
faithful, and eventually left her for another woman—a real ne’er-do-
well.92  Mortified by this exposure of his earlier life, Haynes, who took
great pride in his later turnabout that led to a life of respectability,
claimed invasion of privacy—again for public exposure of private
facts.93  Once again, the claim was denied—this time by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals—on newsworthiness grounds.94
Distinct as these two settings are, they both fall prey to the road-
block that has undercut the promise of the public disclosure of private
facts tort—the newsworthiness defense—harking back to Warren and
85. For another approach to the tort issues discussed in this section, see Danielle Keats Cit-
ron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805 (2010).
86. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.1940).
87. 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993).
88. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807.
89. Id. at 809–11.
90. See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION
AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991).
91. Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1224.
92. Id. at 1224–30.
93. Id. at 1229.
94. Id. at 1233–35.
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Brandeis’s classic article, The Right to Privacy.95  The defense is set
out as an element of the tort in William Prosser’s authoritative Re-
statement Section 652D, requiring that the “matter publicized . . . is
not of legitimate concern to the public.”96
At this initial crossroad, the lack of fit of the public disclosure tort
as a tool for protection against unwarranted personal data disclosures
becomes immediately apparent.  Corporate entities maintaining data
files are simply not defendants analogous to the mass media sources
targeted in virtually all of the public disclosure case law.  In sharp con-
trast, corporate defendants have failed to adequately secure the vic-
tim’s privacy, rather than engaging in publication of the private
information.  Indeed, publication of the information is precisely what
the corporate defendants, have sought, however inadequately, to
avoid.
2. Intrusion upon Seclusion
A leading case in the intrusion tort case law is Nader v. General
Motors Corp.,97 in which the New York Court of Appeals approvingly
stated that the plaintiff, who had been subjected to General Motors’
efforts to discredit him as a critic of auto safety, had a colorable claim
for the securing of private information about his financial affairs.98
Here, the self-evident problem is one of the misplaced defendant.
The tort is inapt for claims against corporate defendants in data
breach cases because the focal point of the tort is on improper access
to the victim’s private information.  That would be quite appropriate,
of course, in a tort action against the hacker who gains access to the
data; however, the claim against the corporate defendant is for failure
to protect against access, not the improper eliciting of private
information.
3. Appropriation of Name or Likeness
A major exception to the misguided path of privacy law involves
claims that the corporate defendant has sold or otherwise provided
private information to third-party commercial advertisers (or appro-
priated the information for its own commercial use).99  Note that this
95. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
97. 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y.1970).
98. Id. at 765–71.
99. The appropriation tort is grounded in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM.
LAW INST. 1977).
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claim does not address harms like identity theft arising from inade-
quate security of personal data.  But it is fertile ground for privacy tort
claims of informational trafficking.
A leading example, is Fraley v. Facebook, Inc.,100 where the court
recognized that the defendants had a privacy right vested in Califor-
nia’s “right to publicity” statute,101 which—like the tort of commercial
appropriation—establishes liability when the defendant makes use of
“another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness for adver-
tising or selling or soliciting purposes.”102  The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants used their personal information, including names and
photos obtained from their Facebook accounts, in paid advertisements
without the plaintiffs’ consent.103  Although the case was eventually
settled, it demonstrates a way in which plaintiffs who are victims of
data breaches might arguably bring a privacy action to protect their
interests.  The limitation of the tort is evident, however—it is reliant
on the plaintiff’s ability to show loss of economic opportunity and
profits that the defendant gained instead through its inappropriate dis-
semination of private data.104  In Fraley, the court noted that the
plaintiff’s claim could go forward because they were able to allege
injuries that were not just hypothetical or potential, but were instead
“concrete and particularized” with respect to each individual
plaintiff.105
This distinction weighed heavily in subsequent cases such as Rojas-
Lozano v. Google, Inc.,106 in which the court granted a motion to dis-
miss because the plaintiffs were unable to show that their private data
was used in a manner for which a reasonable consumer would have
expected compensation.107  The plaintiff brought charges of unfair or
deceptive practices and unjust enrichment against Google for profit-
ing off of users’ “free labor” in its “reCAPTCHA” program during
Gmail sign-ups.108  The reCAPTCHA program, which users were told
served to distinguish between human users and automated programs,
100. 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
101. Id. at 796.
102. Id. at 796–97; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West, Westlaw current through 2016).
103. Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790.
104. Ironically, this tort in fact traces its origins to a non-commercial setting.  In Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., defendant, a flour manufacturer, reproduced a likeness of the plain-
tiff, an attractive young woman, on its advertising posters.  64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).  Plaintiff
sued (unsuccessfully) for the humiliation and emotional distress from this invasion of her pri-
vacy. Id. at 443.
105. Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
106. 159 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
107. Id. at 1106–08, 1113.
108. Id. at 1107–08.
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displayed two words: one that was used for security purposes, and one
that Google’s character recognition technology used to assist in digi-
talization of books.109  Essentially, Google made use of its users’
human input as a part of its transcription service to generate revenue.
The court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to analogize to Fraley, as the
plaintiff failed to show that “the few seconds it takes to type a second
word is something for which a reasonable consumer would expect to
receive compensation.”110
Thus, while plaintiffs have a significantly greater chance of at least
surviving a motion to dismiss when invoking the privacy tort of com-
mercial misappropriation, their claims would require them to be able
to show that use of their personal data generated some economic
profit to which they were entitled.111  Once again, note, however, that
this data security issue is quite distinct from a defendant’s failure to
adequately secure plaintiff’s private information from outside
meddling.
B. Conversion and Trespass to Chattels: Old Wine in New Bottles
Putting aside commercial appropriation, the discussion above sug-
gests that traditional privacy torts are generally inadequate to address
harms to individual privacy stemming from a corporate data breach.
However, torts outside of the standard privacy claims have been ap-
plied in attempts to protect privacy interests in the digital data
context.
1. Conversion
Conversion, which traditionally protected ownership rights over
physical property, has been extended to protect owner rights over dig-
ital information as well.  Conversion imposes liability upon the inten-
tional assertion of control over another’s property so as to interfere
with the property owner’s right to control it,112 and some courts have
held that this protection extends to computer records and data.  In
Thyroff v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,113 the New York Court
of Appeals recognized conversion when the defendant prevented the
plaintiff from accessing his electronic records stored on the defen-
109. Id. at 1106.
110. Id. at 1115.
111. See Robinson v. HSBC Bank USA, 732 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (dis-
missing claim against bank for unauthorized use of photos of plaintiff’s residence for advertising
purposes on grounds of no economic loss/no standing to sue).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
113. 864 N.E.2d 1272 (N.Y. 2007).
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dant’s system, noting that it made little difference whether the infor-
mation was on physical paper or was intangible as computer data.114
By preventing Thyroff from exercising his ownership over his own
records, the defendants had effectively converted his property.115  It
should be noted that the Thyroff conception has not been adopted by
every jurisdiction; some courts have maintained that conversion ap-
plies only to tangible property.116
Assuming conversion of intangible property is recognized, a plain-
tiff in a corporate breach case could argue that their information is
property covered by the conversion tort.  This is especially so in cases
involving a breach of credit card or financial information, in which
there is a clear connection between the digital data and the plaintiff’s
underlying property right.  The more difficult task, however, is that
plaintiffs would have to show the corporation engaged in behavior
that interfered with the plaintiff’s control or right of dominion over
the information.  For example, this could be the period of time in
which the plaintiff could not access accounts or freely utilize finances
due to increased need to monitor for potential unauthorized charges
and fraudulent behaviors—let alone, outright exercise of identity
theft.
Clearly, this is a perfect set-up for an action against the hacker.  But
once again the corporate defendant is one step removed from the
harm, as harms produced by the conversion are clearly the result of
the hacker’s actions.  This gap looms large in efforts to rely on conver-
sion, which is traditionally an intentional tort.  Of course, if it is shown
that the corporation or an employee within the corporation had some
role to play in the data breach, then the plaintiff’s claim would stand
on firm ground.
2. Trespass to Chattels
Like conversion, trespass to chattels has traditionally dealt with
physical property, but it has since been broadened to cover portions of
the digital domain (e.g., computer systems).117  In these claims, the
basis for liability frequently rests on the claim that the defendant had
in some way damaged or impaired the property’s “condition, quality,
114. See id. at 1273, 1278.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 209, 211–13 (D. Mass.
2007) (citing other cases indicating Massachusetts common law does not recognize conversion of
intangible property), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 564 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 2009).
117. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004) (allowing a
preliminary injunction against the defendant’s “search robots” as they may interfere with the
plaintiff’s computer system).
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or value.”118  A leading case is Intel Corp. v. Hamidi,119 in which the
court specified that trespass to chattels need not be tied to physical
damage—rather, it is applicable in instances where there is a deprecia-
tion in “quality” or “value” of the plaintiff’s property, including in-
stances where there is “intermeddling with or use of or damages to the
personal property.”120  However, the court in Hamidi rejected the
claim, as the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant, in using plain-
tiff’s computer system to send mass-emails criticizing plaintiff’s em-
ployment practices, caused any disruption in the system’s
functioning.121
In Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC,122 however, the court found a
trespass to chattels and rejected a required showing of substantial in-
terference with ownership.123  There, the court held that a bombard-
ment of pop-up advertisements supported a finding of trespass to
chattels, as the injury was “the cumulative harm caused by the volume
and frequency of the advertisements”—which caused damages in the
form of “wasted time, computer security breaches, lost productivity,
and additional burdens on the computer’s memory and display
capabilities.”124
But the problem with trespass to chattels is, once again, the neces-
sary “intent” element.  One formulation of the trespass to chattels tort
requires that there be intentional interference, not necessarily to vio-
late the plaintiff’s rights but at least an intent to commit the acts that
lead to such violation.125  Even if the plaintiff could show some evi-
dence of intent on the part of the corporation—a virtually insur-
mountable task—there would need to be a demonstration of harm
done to the “quality or value” of the victim’s data, or rights associated
with that data.  It would be a stretch to meet this requirement by
showing a need for credit-monitoring or short-term restrictions on use
of personal data.126
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
119. 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
120. Id. at 327–28 (citing its holding in Zaslow v. Kroenert, 176 P.2d 1, 7 (1946)).
121. Id. at 308.
122. 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
123. Id. at 1230 (citing CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022
(S.D. Ohio 1997)).
124. Id. at 1233.
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 cmts. b, c (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
126. At the other end of the continuum from intentional tort liability would be a claim for
strict liability for “abnormally dangerous activities.” Id. § 520.  But that theory seems to be of no
avail in the data breach circumstances.  The widely-followed Restatement (Second) of Torts pro-
vision, defining abnormally dangerous activities, listed six factors for consideration, focusing on
high degree of risk of harm, but most importantly for present purposes, requiring “inability to
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C. Negligence Pathways: Theoretical Prospects
If one concedes that corporate data security lapses are just that—
unreasonable failures to maintain adequate security—then the “fit”
that seemed elusive in tracking the privacy torts and various inten-
tional and strict liability options, seems at last to have a prospective
home.  The focal point becomes, as it should be, the intentional
wrongdoing of a third party (the hacker/identity thief), and the ques-
tion arises: Under what circumstances can an intermediary defendant
be held for failing to protect against misconduct by a malevolent third
party?  Two profiles of responsibility for safeguarding against such
third-party initiated harm seem most germane—negligent failure to
provide adequate security, and negligent enabling responsibility.127
1. Negligent Failure to Provide Adequate Security
The first is the case law that has developed from the 1970s to the
present on failure to adequately protect an innocent victim from phys-
ical violence.  There is a particular valence to these cases, which set
aside the long-standing reluctance of tort law to embrace third-party
obligations, expressed in the nonfeasance theme of no duty of affirma-
tive action.  This limitation is surmounted in the contemporary setting
by focusing on the relational obligations of the intermediate defen-
dant, whether landlord to tenant (in the residential violence cases),128
or storeowner to customer (in the business premises violence
cases).129
It is important to note that this status linkage is a considerably less
stringent nexus than a fiduciary relationship.130  Neither occupation—
landlord or store owner—is a status weighted with customary fiduci-
ary responsibilities.  They are status relationships on the same plane
eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care.” Id.  The Restatement (Third) of Torts
collapses the factors into two, but retains the requirement that reasonable care be unavailing to
eliminate the risk. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).  For a leading
case, carefully parsing the Restatement (Second) of Torts factors and holding that a concededly
dangerous activity—the shipping of a highly toxic chemical—nonetheless failed to meet the re-
quirements because due care would have avoided the harm, see Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1181 (7th Cir. 1990).  The inadequate data security cases
almost certainly founder on the same prospective showing.
127. For earlier discussions, see Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the
Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 259–62 (2005); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H.
Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553 (2005).
128. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (lead-
ing case for landlord obligations to tenant).
129. See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993).
130. The latter requirement has been a limiting factor in the development of a robust breach
of confidence tort in the United States.
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with corporate defendants in data security breach cases, where the
corporate entity has implicitly, if not explicitly, represented that it will
safeguard a customer’s private personal or financial information.
Then, the question becomes whether the distinction between secur-
ity against physical violence and against financial/emotional harm
should defeat recognition of an analogous claim for tort protection.
In Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District,131 a negligent mis-
representation case involving misleading letters of reference that set
the stage for child sexual abuse, the California Supreme Court clearly
thought that the distinction should be recognized.132  Depending on
the factual circumstances, a negligent misrepresentation theory might
play out in a corporate data breach scenario, except that the tort claim
as recognized in Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 331, mirrors
the Randi W. holding in limiting liability to physical harms.133
2. Negligent Enabling Conduct
A second prospective doctrinal handle in the case law is the concept
of an enabling tort.134  This is a close cousin to the negligent breach of
security claim.  In both scenarios, a defendant, through substandard
precautionary conduct, has, in essence, set the stage for malevolence
leading to victimization of an innocent party.  There is less than total
overlap, however.  The enabling tort is not dependent on a status rela-
tionship between the intermediary defendant and the victim of third-
party misconduct.  Consider by way of illustration, Weirum v. RKO
General, Inc.,135 in which a radio disk jockey encouraged reckless driv-
ing by offering a prize for tracking him down on the highway;136 or the
key in the ignition cases in which the stage is set for theft, reckless
driving, and third-party injury137—both illustrative of enabling torts,
but neither resting on a status-based nexus between enabler and vic-
131. 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
132. Id. at 591–92.
133. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 331 (AM. LAW INST. 1977), with Randi
W., 929 P.2d at 582.  There is a third-party negligent misrepresentation scenario in which stand-
alone economic loss is well-recognized: The negligent provision of professional services (most
frequently, a negligently-conducted audit that leads to third-party financial losses). See, e.g.,
Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 688 N.E.2d 1368, 1372 (Mass. 1998); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  However, it requires a considerable stretch to
develop a bridge from negligent provision of professional services causing third-party injury to
negligence in safeguarding the immediate security of information providers against outside
malevolence.
134. For discussion, see Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 449 (1999).
135. 529 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
136. Id. at 37–38.
137. See, e.g., Palma v. U.S. Indus. Fasteners, Inc., 681 P.2d 893, 896 (Cal. 1984).
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tim.  Note, however, that this is a distinction without a difference for
the corporate data security cases, in which the status relationship is
invariably present in the defendant’s breach of plaintiff’s informa-
tional privacy.
D. Negligence Pathways: Damages
Now we come to the crux of the matter: Whether there is a viable
claim for tort damages in these corporate data breach scenarios.  This
requires a closer look at the harm experienced by victims in the con-
text of tort remedies.  Consider, initially, claims arising out of the data
breach, standing alone.  Personal and financial information of a con-
cededly private character has fallen prey to a hack, but there is no
indication that the information has been put to illicit use.  In these
circumstances, the financial consequences to the victim most likely
would be limited to credit monitoring (as a safeguard), and transac-
tional costs in re-establishing new personal identifying information.
From a tort perspective, these costs would be characterized as tangi-
ble, stand-alone economic loss.138  The financial outlays would be rela-
tively trivial so long as the focus remains on the harms to individual
victims of the breach, rather than the collective harms.
In fact, the out-of-pocket expenditures associated with this anticipa-
tory-risk scenario seem secondarily consequential.  The more salient
aspect of a hacker’s access to a victim’s supposedly secure personal
data is arguably the affront to one’s privacy and accompanying anxiety
and from the keen awareness that one’s personal information is in the
hands of a malefactor—with a risk that it will be used for illicit pur-
poses at some point.  Whether this harm is viewed in tandem with the
above-mentioned financial consequences, or as stand-alone emotional
distress, the undermining of personal security and equanimity is
undeniable.
Once again, however, from an individual victim perspective—set-
ting aside for now the aggregate harm from a mass security breach—
the tort-related ramifications seem problematic.  Much of the breach-
related distress (aggravation, anxiety) occurs in the “window” be-
tween notice of the breach and fix-related economic outlays.  Beyond
this distress, the lurking concern that the identity theft will be brought
to fruition bears some similarity to the cancerphobia claims in recent
138. For discussion of stand-alone economic loss, see generally Robert L. Rabin, Respecting
Boundaries and the Economic Loss Rule in Tort, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 857 (2006).  For discussion of
the economic loss rule in the context of claims among issuer banks, acquirer banks, and
merchants in the data security cases, see generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Can Data Breach
Claims Survive the Economic Loss Rule?, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 339 (2017).
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long-latency toxic exposure cases.139  But those claims—in the ab-
sence of a threshold underlying disease—have not been viewed favor-
ably in the courts, for the most part.140  Moreover, there is a
substantial categorical distinction between fear and anxiety associated
with the risk of contracting cancer and similar distress over misuse of
personal identifying characteristics.  Without meaning to trivialize the
latter, my own view is that the dominant social concern—at least from
a tort perspective—over the unrealized risk of malevolent use of pri-
vate identifying information is collective rather than individual.
To what extent is this limiting perspective altered when the victim’s
claim is based on a malefactor’s transactional use of the stolen infor-
mation—in other words, identity threat that is brought to fruition—
rather than simply the risk of such use?  The answer turns on the re-
course available to the victim to retrieve misplaced withdrawals
against financial accounts.  In the typical case, the losses would even-
tually be borne by the hacker’s defrauded corporate victim rather than
the innocent victim of the identity theft.141  This, of course, has major
economic consequences for the system of commerce—as briefly
spelled out in the introductory section of this Article.  But beyond the
transactional costs of establishing eligibility for reimbursement (and
re-establishment of frozen sources of credit), these are not conse-
quences likely to animate individual tort claims for economic loss.
To a certain extent, the emotional distress claims associated with a
fully realized identity theft track the discussion of anticipatory harm
discussed above—anxiety, aggravation, and a sense of outrage.  But
there is arguably a distinctive dignitary loss associated with the fully
realized identity theft; that is, a sense of personal transgression and
violation intrinsic to the abuse of one’s equanimity.
In some respects, this aspect of the wrong resembles the one privacy
tort that I have not discussed above: the so-called false light claim,
where the harm arises from being represented as someone other than
one’s true self.142  If the analogue seems compelling, of course, the
139. On toxic exposure claims, see, for example, Bill Charles Wells, The Grin Without a Cat:
Claims for Damages from Toxic Exposure Without Present Injury, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L.
285, 289 (1994).
140. See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
141. If the bank makes payment against the victim’s account on the credit charge and then
reimburses the victim, presumably, the bank would have a right of subrogation against the cor-
porate vendor.  If the identity theft victim refuses payment in the first instance, then the corpo-
rate vendor would simply bear the loss directly.  For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein &
Thomas P. Brown, Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 219–23
(2008).
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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dignitary claim would best be brought against the hacker (along with a
bevy of other tort claims, ranging from conversion to intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress).  Nonetheless, the dignitary aspect of
the emotional distress claim, in the context of a fully realized identity
theft, does seem to be a direct consequence of the harm inflicted by
the failure of the corporate entity to reasonably discharge its security
responsibility.  There does seem to be sufficient grounding here, in
tandem with the more modest financial costs, to make out a colorable
claim for relief.143
While this pathway to tort redress is not a trivial consideration, it
hardly seems likely to serve as a strong incentive in generating an in-
dustry-wide framework of more adequate data security measures.  In
that regard, as the discussion to this point has inferred, an aggregative
mechanism—collective tort action—would seem to be required.  Para-
doxically perhaps, the individual dignitary claim for realized identity
theft is probably least likely to survive aggregate treatment in view of
the class action requirement that common questions of law or fact
predominate over questions affecting individual class members.144
This is so, precisely because the dignitary harm seems so clearly a
case-by-case inquiry.
By contrast, the stand-alone financial losses, particularly among
those arising in fully realized identity thefts, may be more amenable to
aggregate treatment.  Predictably, however, in view of the somewhat
attenuated character of the aggregation claim, there is sharp disagree-
ment on whether class treatment is sustainable.145
143. There is a caveat, however.  If this dignitary harm claim has its foundation in the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress, there is a threshold duty limitation that may be difficult
to surmount.  Negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, in most jurisdictions, require that
the victim be in a zone of physical danger. See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, The Future of Emotional
Harm, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2605, 2615 (2015).
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
145. While the courts are split on class certification in the context of data breaches, several
trends are apparent.  First, class certification is generally granted only in a narrow set of circum-
stances.  For example, courts tend to grant class certification where the plaintiffs’ cause of action
falls under a federal statute like the Fair Credit Reporting Act. See, e.g., Engel v. Scully &
Scully, Inc., 279 F.R.D. 117, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Stillmock v. Weis Mkts., Inc., 2010 WL
2621041, at *7 (4th Cir. July 1, 2010).  This makes sense because the injuries in such cases tend to
be identical across class members.  The other common case where a trial court certifies a plaintiff
class is where the parties reach a settlement agreement. See, e.g., In re LinkedIn User Privacy
Litig., 309 F.R.D. 573, 581 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (certifying settlement class for settlement up to $1.25
million for leaked password information); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec.
Breach Litig., No. 11md2258 AJB (MDD), 2014 WL 7800046, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 10, 2014).
Sony settled with the class of plaintiffs for $15 million for the leak of personal account informa-
tion. See Michael Lipkin, Sony Strikes $15M Deal to Exit Data-Breach MDL, LAW360 (June 23,
2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/548191/sony-strikes-15m-deal-to-exit-data-breach-mdl.
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IV. BEYOND TORT: A CONCLUDING THOUGHT
In the final analysis, my view is that the most promising pathway for
achieving the collective goal of enhancing corporate data security via
tort-type remedies lies outside the tort arena, but shares the safety
incentives objective that animates the search for more effective corpo-
rate data security practices: A growing recognition that substandard
practices might be re-cast as unfair competitive activity through fed-
eral regulatory enforcement.146  In a recent case, Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,147 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the FTC’s finding that a variety of security system
shortcomings by the defendant hotel chain (absence of firewalls, inse-
cure passwords, lax data storage provisions) constituted “unfair trade
practices” under the agency’s section 5 authority.148
Wyndham was the initial instance of a regulated party challenging
in court the FTC’s section 5 enforcement authority in an information
privacy case.149  Indeed, every FTC enforcement action since 2002,
when the Commission began regulating information privacy, has re-
sulted in settlement (including Wyndham).150  One might reasonably
conclude that this ruling will embolden the FTC in its quest to use
section 5 to do the regulatory work that is beyond the capacity of the
In the vast majority of normal data breach cases, courts deny class certification on predomi-
nance grounds—namely, that common questions of liability, causation, and damages do not
predominate over individualized determinations. See, e.g., In re Google, Inc. Gmail Litig., No.
13-MD-02430-LHK, 2014 WL 1102660, at *19–21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) (denying class certi-
fication because issues of implied or express consent, central to liability determination, did not
predominate across the class); In re Hannaford Bros Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 293
F.R.D. 21, 28–29, 33 (D. Me. 2013) (denying class certification on predominance grounds be-
cause plaintiffs may have mitigated damages in very different ways).  This is an unsurprising
result.  The particular features of data breach harms make class certification quite difficult.  Only
in the rare case will a class be able to show that common injuries predominate, as the range of
injuries is often quite wide.  The same is true of issues of causation—what caused the harms at
issue; and mitigation—how much did each class member mitigate?
In a different context, one court certified a class of small financial institutions suing Target for
its data breach and the effects the breach had on the class businesses—namely, reissuing cards
and refunding fraudulent charges. In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 309
F.R.D. 482, 490 (D. Minn. 2015). But see In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 246 F.R.D.
389, 401 (D. Mass. 2007) (denying class certification in similar circumstances). See generally,
Sharkey, supra note 138. R
146. For recent discussion, see Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM L. REV. 583, 598–99 (2014).
147. 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
148. Id. at 258–59.
149. J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, FTC Consumer Protection at 100: 1970s Redux
or Protecting Markets to Protect Consumers?, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2157, 2211 (2015).
150. Id.; Wyndham Settles FTC Charges It Unfairly Placed Consumers’ Payment Card Infor-
mation at Risk, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/2015/12/wyndham-settles-ftc-charges-it-unfairly-placed-consumers-payment.
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tort system and other limited-mandate federal agencies with respect to
data privacy.151
Ultimately, how proactive federal agencies will be in pursuing this
remedial strategy remains an open question.  Nonetheless, a strategy
that focuses on systemic failures to give sufficient regard to our collec-
tive concern about maintaining security of private information seems
preferable to the tort approach of remedying individual claims of
harm, singly or collectively.
151. The FTC in its own administrative complaints and guidance reports has indicated that
section 5 unfairness authority could potentially reach lapses in data security. See FED. TRADE
COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? 22 (2016) (noting that unfair
practice could include “failure to reasonably secure consumers’ data where that failure is likely
to cause substantial injury”); see, e.g., In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 467 (2005)
(finding respondent’s failure to take reasonable measures to secure information, including the
lack of encryption of files in transit and creating unnecessary risk by storing data longer than
needed for business purposes, qualified as an unfair practice); In re ASUSTeK Comput., Inc.,
No. 142-3156, 2016 WL 807981, at *20 (F.T.C. Feb. 22, 2016) (holding that respondent’s failure to
take reasonable steps to secure its software caused or is likely to cause substantial injury and
constituted an unfair practice).  The FTC’s unfairness authority is subject to limitations however.
For example, in determining whether there was a substantial injury, the FTC has in the past
largely focused on actual injuries to consumers as opposed to those that are “trivial, speculative,
[or] emotional.”  Solove & Hartzog, supra note 146, at 639. R
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